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Emerging International Regime of Financial Services
Regulation*
Michael P. Malloy**
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars of U.S. bank regulation have long noted the growing significance of
multilateral sources of rule-creation. U.S. adherence to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS"), including banking services,' and U.S.
membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), which
includes rules for trade in financial services within the region,2 will doubtless
have obvious effects on financial services regulation as these two multilateral
regimes continue to mature. Of immediate interest, however, is the influence of
the undertakings of the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS"), in which U.S.
bank regulators have been participating directly. This essay focuses primarily
upon the new capital adequacy accord for internationally active banks proposed
by the BIS, popularly referred to as "Basel II," which is intended to replace the
capital adequacy guidelines in full operation from 1992. The BIS has already had
an impact on banking regulation that, for the present, far exceeds the GATS and
NAFTA.3

Copyright © 2005 by Michael P. Malloy. Portions of this essay are drawn from the author's
*
forthcoming book, BANKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, to be published by Carolina Academic Press. An
earlier version of this essay was delivered at a meeting of the Irish Society of International Law in Dublin in
November 2003.
** Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Georgetown University.
1. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: General Agreement on Trade in Services, annex. lB, 33 I.
L. M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. On the significance of the GATS for bank regulation, see Chantal
Thomas, Globalization in Financial Services-The Roles of GATS, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 323 (2002);
Michael P. Malloy, InternationalFinancialServices: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 15 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 55 (2002); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A
Regulatory JurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (1995).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., reprintedin 32 I. L. M. 289397, 605-779 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. On the significance of the NAFTA for
bank regulation, see Art Alcausin Hall, InternationalBanking Regulation into the 21st Century: Flirtingwith
Revolution, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41 (2001); Trachtman, supra note 1.
3. One reason for the relative influence of the BIS may be that the impact of other multilateral regimes
has been blunted by specialized rules and exceptions that limit their binding effect on bank regulatory practices
of national regulators. See, e.g., Michael P. Malloy, FinancialServices Regulation after NAFTA, in THE FIRST
DECADE OF NAFTA: THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA (Kevin Kennedy, ed. 2004) (arguing
that "the practical effects of [NAFTA] obligations are likely to emerge only incrementally, and those effects
will have an impact largely cushioned by the intervention of reasonable measures domestically imposed for
prudential reasons").
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A.

Themes of the Essay

The theme of the essay is two-fold. First, given the current significance of the
work of the BIS for rule-creation in national bank regulatory systems, it is
important to begin the process of analysis and assessment of Basel II on its own
terms. Second, stepping back from the current project of the BIS, the essay will
suggest the work of the BIS, as a whole, represents an emerging source of
international law applicable to financial services providers operating in
international markets.
B. The Bankfor InternationalSettlements
The BIS, located in Basel, Switzerland, is a multilateral bank for national
central banks. Traditionally, it has been primarily supported by the "Group of
Ten" large industrialized democracies ("G-10"), consisting of Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
the United States, with Switzerland as an additional significant participant. The
BIS assists central banks in the transfer and investment of monetary reserves and
often plays a role in settling international loan arrangements. Of increasing
significance is its role as a forum or catalyst for international monetary
cooperation and regulatory policy development.
In 1974, the failure of Herstatt Bank in Germany and Franklin National Bank
in New York, with financial repercussions throughout the increasingly
"internationalized" banking market, led the G-10 to sponsor an informal
understanding on the resolution of international bank failures, known as the Basel
Concordat. The Governors of the BIS acknowledged the need to establish a
framework of multilateral bank supervision, so they formed the Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, now known as Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision ("the Committee"). The Committee currently consists of
foreign exchange and supervisory officials from the G-10, plus officials from
Luxembourg, Spain, and Switzerland.
The Committee promotes cooperation among national regulators. It
facilitates the establishment of broadly delineated principles to guide the
differing national supervisory systems in establishing their own detailed
arrangements. This was the approach taken by the 1974 Concordat in establishing
a set of broad principles for the resolution of future bank crises. The broadness of
the guiding principles articulated in the 1974 Concordat proved to be insufficient
when Banco Ambrosiano, based in Italy with a subsidiary in Luxembourg, failed
in 1982. Italian authorities first indicated that, from their perspective as "lender
of last resort" to the bank, they would honor only Ambrosiano's domestic (i.e.,

4. For extended discussion of the BIS, see
§§ 9.7-9.9 (2d ed. 2003).
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Italian) obligations, causing great distress in the banking world. Eventually, a
large group of creditor banks of the Luxembourg subsidiary reached a settlement
with the Italian central bank, involving more than $300 million in subsidiary
obligations. One result of the difficulties of resolving this multinational bank
failure was the revision of the Concordat in 1983.' The revision articulated in
greater detail supervisory responsibilities with respect to multinational banking
enterprises.
Since the issuance of the Basel Concordat, the Committee has given further
attention to the problems of supervising transnational banking enterprises. An
April 1990 Supplement to the Concordat sought to strengthen the principle of
effective information flow between home-country and host-country authorities,6
by making the rules on information transfer more explicit and detailed.
The 1991 scandal surrounding the collapse of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International ("BCCI") 7 subsequently caused the BIS Committee to
review the arrangements for coordination of international bank supervision,
which had proved inadequate in the events surrounding the BCCI collapse.
Hence, in June 1992, the Committee took the further significant step of issuing a
report establishing minimum standards on the supervision of international
banking enterprises. 8 While the standards were not, on their own terms, binding
on states, the states participating in BIS were expected to implement them, and
other states were encouraged to do so. In the United States, implementation
occurred primarily in connection with the enactment of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvements Act.9
More recently, the Committee, in conjunction with the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
0
developed a set of core principles for effective banking supervision. The Core

5. Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,
Principlesfor the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, in MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 55-60 (1998) [hereinafter MALLOY].
6. Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices:
Supplement to the Basel Concordat Ensuring of Adequate Information Flows between Banking Supervisory
Authorities, in MALLOY, supra note 5, at 61-64.
7. For a review of the BCCI scandal and the legislative reaction to the scandal in the United States, see
RAi K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI (1994).
8. Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory
Practices: Report on Minimum Standardsfor the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their
Cross-BorderEstablishment,in MALLOY, supra note 5, at 64-68.
9. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(1)(A) (approval of U.S. branch of foreign bank; comprehensive
supervision of applicant on consolidated basis by home state authorities required); § 3105(d)(3)(A) (same;
consent of home state to establishment of U.S. branch as standard of approval by U.S. authorities);
§ 3105(e)(1)(A) (termination of U.S. office of foreign bank when foreign bank not subject to comprehensive
supervision on consolidated basis by home state authorities).
10. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Core Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision,
37 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 405 (1998) [hereinafter Core Principles]. The principles are, of course, not binding in
themselves, but "serve as a basic reference for supervisory and other public authorities in all countries and
internationally." Id. at 407.
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Principles consist of twenty-five basic principles, ranging from preconditions for
effective banking supervision (Principle 1) to principles for cross-border banking
(Principles 23-25). Significantly, the principles address in detail prudential
regulations and requirements (Principles 6-15), which have the effect of requiring
careful supervision of management operations and internal controls.
C. CapitalAdequacy
The BIS was also responsible for what is perhaps the most influential
contemporary development in the international supervision of banking-the
formulation of uniform guidelines governing the measurement and enforcement
of capital adequacy of banks." In U.S. practice, capital adequacy requirements
predate the BIS efforts.'2 However, the rules developed under BIS auspices were
aimed not only at a capital adequacy regime that would be effective as a purely
regulatory matter, but also one that would encourage a multilateral convergence
of regulatory standards. What is significant in the present context, however, is
that the U.S. regulators chose to apply this multilateral regime not just to
internationally active banks (as contemplated
by the BIS capital guidelines) but
3
to all banks subject to federal regulation.'
The guidelines set forth "the details of the agreed framework for measuring
capital adequacy and the minimum standard to be achieved which the national
supervisory authorities represented on the Committee intend to implement in
their respective countries."' The basic focus of this multilateral framework was
"assessing capital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty failure)."' 5
However, the framework acknowledged that "other risks, notably interest rate
risk and the investment risk on securities, need[ed] to be taken into account by
supervisors in assessing overall capital adequacy."'' 6 The framework consisted of
a minimum required ratio of certain specified constituents of capital to riskweighted assets. In this context "capital" has two types of constituents:" core

11. Bank for International Settlements, Final Report for International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, 4 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 47-105 (Mar. 15, 1996) [hereinafter
Final Report]. For discussion of the BIS capital adequacy rules and their implementation in U.S. law, see
MALLOY, supra note 4, § 7.8.
12. See Michael P. Malloy, U.S. InternationalBanking and the New CapitalAdequacy Requirements:
New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 75, 75-76, 81-87 (1988) (discussing pre-BIS regulatory
practice).

13. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § l(b)(2) (explaining that the Comptroller's risk-based capital
guidelines "apply to all national banks"); id. pt. 208, app. A, § I (applying Federal Reserve's risk-based capital
guidelines "to all state member banks on a consolidated basis"); id. pt. 325, app. A (applying FDIC's risk-based
capital maintenance rules "to all FDIC-insured state-chartered banks ... that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System... regardless of size").
14.

Final Report, supra note 11, at 51,166.

15.
16.

Id. at 51,167.
Id.
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capital;"' 7 and "supplementary capital."'" Core capital, the so-called "Tier 1" of
capital elements, consists of equity capital 9 and disclosed reserves from post-tax
earnings.2 0
The eligible constituents of Tier 1 and supplementary capital (the so-called
2
"Tier 2" capital) are subject to certain deductions under the framework. ' The
amount of goodwill must be deducted from the figure for Tier 1 capital. The
amount of investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiaries, if
4
any,23 must be deducted from the total capital base) The Committee considered,
but ultimately rejected, requiring deduction of banks' holdings of capital issued
by other banks or depository institutions. 2 Nevertheless, the framework does
reflect the agreement that individual supervisory authorities retain the discretion
to require such deductions.26 If no deduction is applied, such holdings are
required to bear an asset risk-weight of 100 percent for purposes of assessing
capital adequacy of the holding bank.27
The framework endorsed a risk-weighted approach to the assets denominator
of the capital-assets ratio.2 ' The framework established a relatively simple
29
methodology for risk-weighting, with only five risk weights being employed.
3
0
Essentially, the methodology effectively captured only credit risk. It left to the
discretion of individual supervisory authorities the ability to decide whether to
17. See id. (discussing meaning of "core capital"). See generally id. at 51,173, Annex 1 (defining capital
in terms of capital base after transitional period).
18. See id. at 51,167-51,168 (discussing meaning of "supplementary capital"). See generally id. at
51,173, Annex 1 (defining capital in terms of capital base after transitional period).
19. For these purposes, "equity capital" is defined as "[i]ssued and fully paid ordinary shares/common
stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (but excluding cumulative preferred stock)." Id. at 51,167 n.
2. See also id. at 51,174, Annex 1, § D(i) (defining "Tier 1" capital elements). In the case of consolidated
accounts, Tier 1 capital would also include minority interests in the equity of subsidiaries of the bank that are
less than wholly owned. Id.
20. Id. at 51,167. For these purposes, disclosed reserves are reserves that are "created or increased by
appropriations of retained earnings or other surplus, e.g. share premiums, retained profit, general reserves and
legal reserves." Id. at 51,174. Tier 1 does not include revaluation reserves. Id.
21. Id. at 51,169.
22. Id.
23. The framework generally assumes as the normal practice that subsidiaries will be consolidated for
the purpose of assessing capital adequacy, but "[w]here this is not done, deduction is essential to prevent
multiple use of the same capital resources in different parts of [a banking] group." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Conceivably, these discretionary policies may require deduction of the amount of all such
holdings, holdings to the extent that they exceed some determined limit in relation to the holding bank's or the
issuing bank's capital, or on a case-by-case basis. Id. The framework also reflected the agreement that, "in
applying these policies, member countries [should] consider that reciprocal cross-holdings of bank capital
designed artificially to inflate the capital position of the banks concerned should not be permitted." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at51,175-51,176, Annex 2 (establishing risk weights by categories of on-balance-sheet
asset).
30. Id. at 51,169.
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attempt to account for more methodologically difficult types of risk, such as
investment risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk or concentration risk.'
Furthermore, the individual supervisory authorities also retained discretion to
supplement the framework's risk-weighted methodology with "other methods of
capital measurement, '3 2 such as the mandated capital-assets ratios previously
established by individual national regulators. To account for country transfer risk,
the Committee adopted an approach that applied differing risk-weights to defined
groups of countries.33
The framework also recognized the importance of bringing off-balance-sheet
risk into the analysis of capital adequacy. 34 All categories of off-balance-sheet
risk were brought within the framework, by conversion into appropriate credit
risk equivalents.3"
Uncertainty remained regarding the appropriate approach to items exposed to
significant interest-rate and exchange-rate related risk, such as swaps, options
and futures.36 As to these contingencies, the framework took the position that
special treatment was necessary, "because banks are not exposed to credit risk for
the full face value of their contracts, but only to the cost of replacing the cash
flow if the counterparty defaults. 37
Once the credit equivalent amounts of such contingencies have been
calculated, the amounts are to be weighted in accordance with the risk weights
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 51,169-51,170.
Id. at 51,169.
Id. at 51,170-51,171:
[T]he Committee has concluded that a defined group of countries should be adopted as the
basis for applying differential weighting coefficients[.] The framework also recognizes the
importance of and that this group should be full members of the OECD or countries which
have concluded special arrangements with the [International Monetary Fund] associated with
the Fund's General Arrangements to Borrow....
This decision has the following consequences for the weighting structure. Claims on central
governments within the OECD will attract a zero weight (or a low weight if the national
supervisory authority elects to incorporate interest rate risk); and claims on OECD non-central
government public-sector entities will attract a low weight.... Claims on central governments
and central banks outside the OECD will also attract a zero weight (or a low weight if the national supervisory authority elects to incorporate investment risk), provided such claims are
denominated in the national currency and funded by liabilities in the same currency....
As regards the treatment of interbank claims, in order to preserve the efficiency and liquidity of
the international interbank market[,] there will be no differentiation between short- term claims
on banks incorporated within or outside the OECD. However, the Comnittee draws a
distinction between.. . short-term placements with other banks.., and.., longer-term crossborder loans to banks which are often associated with particular transactions and carry greater
transfer and/or credit risks. A 20 per cent [sic] weight will therefore be applied to claims on all
banks, wherever incorporated, with a residual maturity of up to an[d] including one year;
longer-term claims on OECD incorporated banks will be weighted at 20 per cent [sic]; and
longer-term claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD will be weighted at 100 percent.
See id. at 51,171-51,172 (discussing treatment of off-balance-sheet engagements).
See id. at 51,176, Annex 3 (establishing credit conversion factors for off-balance-sheet items).
Id. at 51,172.
Id.
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applicable to the category of counterparties involved. However, in anticipation of
the fact that most counterparties in the market for such contingencies, particularly
long-term contracts, "tend to be first-class names,"38 the Final Report reflected
general agreement that such contingencies would be assigned a 50 percent risk
weight, rather than the 100 percent risk weight that might otherwise be
applicable.3 9.
The final element in the risk-weighted methodology, as with any capitalassets ratio requirement, is the required minimum level of the ratio. As the
proposed version of this multilateral agreement was taking shape, it was
generally agreed that specifying a target ratio was desirable before the proposed
framework was circulated at the national level for consultation and discussion.
After further consultations and study of the proposed version, the framework
adopted a target standard ratio of eight percent, of which core capital must
constitute at least four percent.40 This target ratio became fully applicable at yearend 1992.4'
The Basel Committee has continued to refine the details and mechanics of
risk management and supervision. 2 Correspondingly, implementation of the
guidelines in the United States has not been a static project; the guidelines have
been the subject of almost continuous reassessment and refinement by the
regulators.4 '3 By the mid-1990s, the agencies were seriously focusing upon

38. Id. at 51,178.
39. Id. However, some member countries have apparently reserved the right to apply the full 100
percent risk weight. Id. n. 9.
40. Id. at 51,172.
41. Id.at5l,172-51,173.
42. See, e.g., BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS ("BIS"), COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, THE TREATMENT OF THE CREDIT RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS

(1994); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES
(1994); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD OF JULY 1988
(1994); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF BANKS' DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES (1994); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF
POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS (1995); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
AN INTERNAL MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (1995); BIS, COMMITTEE
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS
AND SECURITIES FIRMS (1995); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR
THE USE OF "BACKTESTING"

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTERNAL MODELS APPROACH TO MARKET RISK

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (JAN.

1996); BIS,

COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE

BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE

MARKET RISKS (1996);

BIS,

COMMITTEE ON BANKING

SUPERVISION, INTERPRETATION OF THE CAPITAL ACCORD FOR THE MULTILATERAL NETTING OF FORWARD
VALUE FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS (1996); BIS, COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES

(2001). Most recently, the Basel Committee
has asked for comment, by October 31, 2003, on revised interest rate risk principles as part of its larger work on
developing new international bank capital standards. Basel Committee Asks for Comment On Revised Interest
Rate Risk Principles,BNA Banking Daily, Sept. 8,2003, available at http://www. bis.org/publlbcbsl02.htm
(providing the revised consultative paper and a summary explanation concerning the new proposal ).
43. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 55,686 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 325, 567) (proposing
uniform treatment of certain construction, real estate loans and investments in mutual funds; simplifying Tier 1
capital standards); 62 Fed. Reg. 55,692 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (proposing similar
FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF INTEREST RATE RISK
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management of interest-rate risk, which was not within the purview of the
original guidelines." Similarly, the regulators have folded market-risk provisions
into the framework of the guidelines.
II. BASEL I
A.

Objectives and General Framework

The capital adequacy methodology exhibited some serious shortcomings.
First, the framework primarily recognized only a narrow, though very significant,
type of risk-credit risk, i.e., the risk of counterparty failure.46 Over time, the
methodology was refined to fold in other types of risk; namely interest-rate risk
and exchange-rate risk.4'7 Nevertheless, there was still no calibration within the
methodology for internal or "operational" risk 8 broadly speaking, the risks
amendments with respect to treatment of capital of bank holding companies); 62 Fed. Reg. 59,944 (1997) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567) (proposing regulatory capital treatment of recourse obligations
and direct credit substitutes); 64 Fed. Reg. 10,194 (1999) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 325, 567) (OCC,
Fed, FDIC and OTS rules for construction loans on pre-sold residential properties, junior liens on one- to fourfamily residential properties, investments in mutual funds, and Tier I leverage ratio); 64 Fed. Reg. 10,201
(1999) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (corresponding Fed rule applicable to bank holding companies); 65 Fed.
Reg. 12,320 (2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567) (proposing changes in risk-based
capital standards to address recourse obligations and direct credit substitutes); 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480 (2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, Appendices A, D) (proposing regulatory capital treatment of certain investments
in nonfinancial companies by bank holding companies); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,971 (2002), corrected, 67 Fed. Reg.
34,991 (2002) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567) (reducing risk-weight applicable to claims on,
and claims guaranteed by, qualifying U.S. securities firms and securities firms incorporated in OECD member
countries from 100 percent to 20 percent; conforming FDIC and OTS rules to existing OCC and Fed to permit
zero percent risk weight for certain claims on qualifying securities firms collateralized by cash on deposit in
lending institution or by securities issued or guaranteed by the United States or other OECD central
governments); 68 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (2003) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, pt.208, app. A, pt.225, app. A,
pt. 325, app. A, §§ 567.1, 567.5(a)(1)(iii), 567.6(a)((3)-(4)) (issuing interim final rule to remove consolidated
asset-backed commercial paper program assets from risk-weighted asset bases for purpose of calculating riskbased capital ratios).
44. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 33,166 (1996) (publishing OCC, FRS & FDIC joint policy statement
providing guidance on sound practices for managing interest rate risk). But see 67 Fed. Reg. 31,722 (2002)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 516.40(a)(2), 567.1, 567.5(b)(4), 567.6(a)(1)(iv)(G)-(H); removing § 567.7) (imposing
50 percent risk weight for certain qualifying mortgage loans; eliminating interest rate risk component of riskbased capital regulations; making technical amendments).
45. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 68,064 (1997) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325) (amending market
risk provisions in risk-based capital standards).
46. For extensive discussion of the types of risk relevant to the conduct of the business of banking, see
Core Principles,supra note 10, § W.A.
47. See, e.g., supra note 43 (citing revisions in methodology to account for interest rate and exchange
rate risks).
48. The term operational risk may be defined as "the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from
inadequate or failed intemal processes, people and systems or from external events." BIS, COMMITT-EE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE NEW CAPITAL AccoRD 94 ( 2001) [hereinafter
Accord]. As used in the BIS proposed Accord, the term does not include strategic and reputational risk. Id. For
discussion of reputational risk, see Core Principles, supra note 10, at 291. A working paper of the BIS
Committee's Risk Management Group has proposed the deletion of the phrase "direct or indirect" from the
definition of operational loss, because it was too vague. RISK MANAGEMENT GROUP, BIS COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, WORKING PAPER ON THE REGULATORY TREATMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK, available
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attendant upon poor management of asset risks, yet surely this type of risk was
important for safety and soundness purposes.
Second, the methodology for risk-weighting was technically rudimentary.
Five basic risk weights-0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 percent of asset value-were
available for all types of assets and all types of counterparties. This arrangement
produced such anomalous results as the application of the same risk-weight to a
commercial loan to a small business operating a local retail computer store and a
commercial loan to a major dot.com corporation, despite the obvious differences
in the relative risks involved in the two borrowers.
Third, the framework did not take into account the dramatic changes in the
contours of the banking market itself. These changes included consolidation in
holding company patterns of ownership and control of increasingly diversified
financial services enterprises. Consolidation and diversification were taking place
in a markedly more globalized market environment.
Fourth, the methodology tended to be insensitive to the individual experience
and operational qualities of banks. The framework had one size to fit all banks
subject to capital adequacy requirements.4 9 Thus, greater reliance on standardized
capital adequacy calculations-a tendency clearly exhibited by U.S. statutescarried with it the danger that there would be less emphasis on individualized
safety-and-soundness assessment of particular banks.
Over the past decade, the BIS Committee began working on amendments to
the 1988 Guidelines in order to take account of new globalized financial practices
and to create a more flexible, risk-sensitive framework for determining minimum
capital requirements. ° In June 1999, the BIS issued a proposal that would
significantly revise the capital adequacy accord5' in two basic ways: by
extensively refining the 1988 guidelines and by providing a dramatic alternative
approach. The new approach had three basic principles: (i) international banks
would be required to establish their own internal methods for assessing the
relative risks of their assets; (ii) supervisory authorities would be expected to
exercise greater oversight of these capital assessments; and (iii) greater
transparency in banking operations would be required, e.g., the creditworthiness
of borrowing governments and corporations would be assessed by credit-rating
at http://www.bis.org [hereinafter RMG Working Paper].In June of 2002, the Basel Committee announced that
it would be seeking detailed information from internationally active banks with respect to operational risk
exposures for 2001. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Seeks More Bank Data on OperationalRisk Exposuresfor
FY 2001, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 7,2002, at d7.
49. This was particularly true of the U.S. application of the BIS framework. While the framework by its
own terms applied only to international banks, U.S. statutes and implementing regulations applied the capital
adequacy regime to all banks subject to federal regulation. See supra note 13 and accompanying text
(discussing scope of U.S. capital adequacy rules).
50. See Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Sets Out Changes to Risk Calculations Under CapitalAccord,
BNA Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily, Oct. 3, 2001, at d3 (discussing BIS motivations for proposed Capital Accord). See
also supra note 42 (citing BIS issuances concerning refinement of capital adequacy framework).
51. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, An InternationalBanking Panel Proposes Ways to Limit Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1999, at C4 (describing proposed revision).
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agencies, and these ratings would be used by banks in pricing loans to such
borrowers. Financial institutions had until March 31, 2000 to respond to the
proposed revisions, which the BIS anticipated would be effective no sooner than
2001.52
B. Analysis of Specific Featuresof the Proposal
A revised version of the proposal was issued for comment in January 2001."
This version adopted a three-pronged approach to capital adequacy for
international banks that were qualified to use it: capital adequacy requirements
(largely revised from the 1988 guidelines);54 increased supervision of bank capital
maintenance policies;55 and greater transparency through disclosure to the market,
with resulting market discipline 6 These elements are referred to as the three
"pillars" of minimum capital requirements, the supervisory review process, and
market discipline.
Of the three pillars, by far the most extensively discussed in the proposal was
the first pillar, which would involve significant changes in capital adequacy
regulation. First, capital requirements would be extensively revised from the
original framework version and would offer banks two alternative approaches to
capital adequacy. The standardized approach57 would be essentially the 1988
guidelines, as revised by the new Accord. 8 The revisions represented refinements
of the guidelines, including for example more articulated risk weights with
respect to claims on sovereign borrowers based upon their credit assessments by
export credit agencies. 59 Furthermore, the Accord would impose a requirement
that internationally active banks account for operational risk (arising from poor
documentation, fraud, infrastructural failure and the like), 60 in addition to credit
and market risk.6' Generally, the charge for operational risk would involve
approximately 20 percent of overall capital requirements. 62 The capital
requirements would be applied to consolidated and sub-consolidated elements of
larger financial services enterprises.63

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at C4.
Accord, supra note 48.
See Accord at 6-103 (discussing approaches to capital requirements).
See id. at 104-112 (discussing supervision).
See id. at 114-133.
Id. at 7-31.
Id.at7.
Id. at 7-8.
See supranotes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing operational risk).
Accord, supra note 48, at 95.
Id. at 95 n.51.
Id.at 1:
I. The New Basel Capital Accord... will be applied on a consolidated basis to
internationally active banks....
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As an alternative to the standardized approach, banks that could demonstrate
to their supervisors an internal methodology for assigning exposures to different
classes of assets consistently over time 64 would be able to maintain capital in
accordance with an internal credit ratings system (the so called "internal ratings
based," or "IRB" approach).6 ' The IRB approach was based upon sophisticated
computer modeling or other in-house analytical tools to determine credit risk on 6a
on assets. 1
borrower-by-borrower basis that included an estimate of future losses
Two methodologies were available in this regard. The foundation methodology
would allow the bank to estimate internally the probability of default on the asset,
while using regulator-imposed analysis of other risk components associated with
the asset.67 Under the advanced methodology, a sophisticated bank would be
permitted to use internally generated estimates for other risk components.68
C. Likely Effects
In its proposed version, the new Accord was highly criticized by banking
69
industry commentators, mainly because reporting requirements were perceived
as excessive and the level of capital charges were viewed as unnecessarily high.
In addition, in the Spring of 2001, the annual report of the Basel Committee,
reviewing the public disclosure practices of international banks, criticized the
relative lack of disclosure in areas related to credit risk modeling and use of
internal and external ratings by major banks. 70 This seriously implicated the
proposed Accord since disclosure of information with respect to the use of

The scope of application of the Accord will be extended to include, on a fully consolidated
basis, holding companies that are parents of banking groups to ensure that it captures risks
within the whole banking group....
3. The Accord will also apply to all internationally active banks at every tier within a banking
group....
(Footnote omitted.) However, the parent holding company of a banking group's holding company may not itself
be subject to the Accord if it is not viewed as a parent of a banking group. Id. at 1.
64. Accord, supra note 48, at 32.
65. Id. at 32-86.
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. In October 2001, a task force of the BIS Committee questioned whether the foundation approach
was necessary and asked for comment from the banking industry on this issue. MODELS TASK FORCE, BIS
2.

COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Working Paper on the Internal Ratings-Based Approach to Specialized

Lending Exposures), available at, http://www.bis.org [hereinafter MTF Working Paper].
68. Accord, supra note 48, at 34.
69. See Pruzin, supra note 50, at d3 (noting industry opposition).
70. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites Mixed Results for Meeting Proposed Capital Accord, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 24, 2001, at d2. However, in a May 2002 report, the Basel Committee indicated
that internationally active banks had modestly increased their public disclosure of such information during
2000. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites "Modest" Improvement in Information Disclosures, BNA INT'L
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 16, 2002, at d5. Nevertheless, it did caution that most banks still failed to provide such
information with respect to the use of credit derivatives and other sophisticated instruments subject to reporting
requirements under the proposed accord. Id.
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internal ratings is necessary for banks to qualify for the IRB approach proposed
in "Pillar 1" of the new accord.7'
In fact, as a result of the critical comments that were received in response to
the last version of the proposal, and the need for further study and adjustment of
the proposal in light of those comments, in June 2001 the BIS Committee
decided to delay implementation of the proposed Capital Accord until 2005 .
The delay was particularly welcomed by the European Commission, which had
launched a consultative process for a parallel EU proposal based on the Basel
Committee's recommendations. 73 The Commission noted that, during its own
consultation process, the proposed calibration of risk weights and the potential
impact of the proposed ratio of regulatory capital to operational risk (a ratio of
twenty percent) had been consistently criticized by various sectors of the banking
and financial services industry.74 Concerns had also been raised about the
relatively tight timetable for finalizing the new capital regime.75
In a working paper issued September 28, 2001, the Risk Management Group
of the BIS Committee on Banking Supervision outlined changes to the proposed
Capital Accord.76 The proposed changes to "Pillar 1" of the Accord would
include, inter alia, a significant lowering of the operational risk charge as a
percentage of a bank's overall capital set-aside requirements and greater
flexibility in the use of advanced internal risk estimate methods for determining a
bank's minimum capital requirements.77 Comments on the proposed changes

were to be received by October 31, 2001 .
On October 5, 2001, the BIS Committee released another working paper,
proposing further changes to the revised Accord.7 9 The working paper focused on

issues concerning the application of IRB approaches to risk assessment, and
specifically on the treatment of "specialized loans" such as project finance
undertakings. 0 The working paper proposed a specific framework for treatment
of specialized loans that relied upon a stream of income generated by an asset
rather than the creditworthiness of the borrower for repayment of the loan. Such a
loan arrangement does not conform to assumptions underlying the IRB approach
71. Pruzin, Basel Committee CitesMixed Results, supra note 70.
72. Daniel Pruzin, Capital Accord Draft Completion Delayed as Basel Committee Eyes New Revisions,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 26, 2001, at d3.
73. Joe Kirwin, EC Welcomes Basel Committee Delay in Implementing New Capital Accord, BNA
BANKING DAILY, June 26, 2001, at d3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. RMG Working Paper,supra note 48. See Pruzin, supra note 50, at d3 (reporting on implications of
RMG Working Paper).
77. See Pruzin, supra note 50, at d3 (discussing proposed changes).
78. Id.
79. MTF Working Paper,supra note 67. See Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Outlines Further Changes
to IRB Approach in Proposed CapitalAccord, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 10, 2001, at d5 (reporting on
MTF Working Paper).
80. MTF Working Paper, supra note 48.
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of the revised Accord, which tends to focus on the ongoing operations of the
borrower as the source of repayment.81 The proposed treatment of specialized
loans would include any loans that exhibited the following characteristics: (i) the
loan is intended for the acquisition or financing of an asset; (ii) an asset cash flow
is the sole or almost sole source of repayment; (iii) the loan represents a
significant liability for the borrower; and (iv) the key determinant of credit risk is
the existence of variability of asset cash flow, rather than the independent
creditworthiness of the borrower's overall enterprise.82 According to the MTF
Working Paper, four loan products clearly met these criteria: project finance,83
income-producing real estate, big-ticket lease financing (or "object financing"),
and commodity financing. These and possibly other loan products would be
subject to a single framework, with a specified set of components generating
minimum capital requirements related to the specialized loan products.
In December 2001, the BIS Committee announced that it had decided to
carry out a comprehensive quantitative impact study ("QIS") immediately, to
assess the overall impact of the proposed capital accord on banks and the banking
system. 4 The revised version of the Accord, which the Committee had planned to
circulate in early 2002, has been postponed indefinitely 5 This development
raised doubts as to whether the new Accord would be finalized during 2002 and
implemented by 2005.86
In fact, as controversy and criticism continued to build with respect to Basel
II, it was not until July 2003 that the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation even scheduled discussion of a joint advance notice of
proposed rulemaking with respect to the proposal 7 Prospects for reaching
consensus on such an implementing rule remain very much in doubt both because
of the complexity of Basel II itself and because of the diverging and conflicting
interests that need to be reconciled by the Basel Committee and by home country
regulators. 8
The momentum behind the Basel II continued to dissipate. In April 2003, the
Basel Committee asked for comment on its "Third Consultative Paper of the New

81. See, e.g., Accord, supra note 79, at 50-51 (discussing risk assessment criteria applicable to corporate
exposures).
82. Pruzin, supra note 79, atd5.
83. The MTF understood project finance to include specialized lending transactions ("in which the
lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a single project") for security and repayment. MTF Working
Paper, supranote 67. For discussion of project finance and other specialized forms of lending, see Michael P.
Malloy, International Project Finance: Risk Analysis and Regulatory Concerns, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 89
(2004).
84. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Announces Further Delay to Completion of Revised Capital
Accord, INT'L Bus. & FIN.DAILY, Dec. 14, 2001, at d9.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting statement issued by the Committee).
87. Richard Cowden, FDIC, Fed Schedule July 11 Discussion Of ANPR for Basel 11CapitalAccord
Plan, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 8,2003.

88. Id.at1.
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Basel Capital Accord" and indicated its intention to finalize in the near future a
Basel II Accord that would be implemented in 2007.89 In August 2003, the British
Bankers' Association and the London Investments Banking Association
confirmed that they had requested a delay in Basel II until 2010, and expressed a
desire that the Basel II rules be further revised to be "less prescriptive and more
principles-based." 90 Towards the end of that month, Standard & Poor's Rating
Service ("S&P") announced that it might downgrade banks if it disagreed with
methods the banks used under Basel II to calculate capital requirements. 9
Although S&P expressed support for the Basel II effort to improve bank
sensitivity to risk and risk assessment and measurement, "changes in the
availability of credit arising from incentives created by the accord could have farreaching effects on bank funding, the continued development of international
capital markets, and the global economy. 92
The BIS appears to have emerged from this institutional crisis of confidence
with its reputation more or less intact. In May 2004, the Committee announced
that it had reached agreement on outstanding issues that had impeded the
finalizing of the Basel II Accord.93 The Committee stated that it would adhere to
a proposed year-end 2006 target date for banks to adopt the more basic
"standardized" and "foundation IRB" approaches for assessing minimum capital
charges. 94 However, for banks adopting the most advanced Internal RatingsBased ("IRB") approaches-which includes most, if not all major internationallyactive banks, the Committee expected that a year-end 2007 target date was
necessary to allow further impact analysis and parallel running before full
implementation.9
In June 2004, the Committee approved the final version of the revised
Accord.96 The Committee emphasized that it would continue to review the
calibration of the accord prior to its implementation and adjust it as necessary to

89. R. Christian Bruce, Regulators Must Supply More Answers Before Basel Can Be Adopted, Shelby,
Sarbanes Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 19, 2003, at 1.

90. Patrick Tracey and Karen Werner, British Banking Groups Seek Delay In Basel H CapitalAccord
Until 2010, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 11, 2003, at 1. The detailed response of the two associations to the
latest version of Basel II is available at http://www.bba.org.uk/pdf/144112.pdf
91.

Richard Cowden, S&P Report Says It Might Downgrade Banks Some Banks Under Basel H Rules,

BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 28, 2003. The Standard & Poor's report on Basel II is available at http://www.
standardandpoors.com.
92. Cowden, S&P Report, supra note 91, at 1 (quoting Barbara Ridpath, Managing Director and Chief
Criteria Officer, Standard & Poor's Europe).
93. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Announces Deal On Key Remaining Accord Issues, BNA BANKING
DAILY, May 12, 2004. These issues included calibration of minimum capital requirements, the proposed capital
charge for operational risk, and the use of advanced internal ratings-based ("IRB") systems for assessing bank
capital charges. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK
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(2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 107.htm.

CAPITAL

STANDARDS:

A

REVISED

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 18

ensure that the new capital rules did not result in a sharp increase in overall
minimum capital requirements.97 As with the previous guidelines, the Committee
expected that the revised Accord would become the global standard for minimum
capital requirements.98 However, India and China, among other major developing
countries, have already indicated that they did not intend to adopt the revised
accord, 99 and U.S. regulators-including the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") as well as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed"), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")-have
decided that it will only be required for the relatively small number of the largest
internationally-active U.S. banks."
Basel II would certainly seem to address many of the shortcomings observed
in the current capital guidelines.0'° The proposal recognizes a much wider
spectrum of risk, going well beyond the risk of counterparty failure to include
even operational risk as a component in the calculation of capital adequacy
requirements. It involves a relatively more articulated methodology for weighing
the risks of specific types of assets, possibly even including specialized loan
products with their own risk assessment methodology. It also addresses the
marked changes in the nature of the international banking market since the
emergence of the framework in 1988, as in its elaborate rules with respect to
consolidation and subconsolidation in holding company patterns of ownership
and control of complex, diversified financial services enterprises. Finally, it also
appears more risk-sensitive because of its resort to individualized treatment of
sophisticated banking enterprises, which is exemplified by its provisions for IRB
assessment of asset risks.
One fundamental question is still unresolved. Why use capital as the basic
measuring tool of safety and soundness in banking supervision? In traditional
corporate law terms, capital serves at least four distinct roles, among others. First,
capital is the source of the primary (or, at least, the most significant) operational
financial resources for the corporate enterprise. Second, it is the marker for the
competing property interests in the enterprise, indicating the ultimate (i.e.,
liquidational) property rights of various classes of investors. Third, capital serves
as a marker for associational rights and obligations, indicating, for example, the
relative voting rights of different classes of investors. Fourth, capital is the
primary measure or precondition of insolvency.

97.

Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Approves 'Final' Version of Capital Accord; Criteria Could Still

'Evolve', BNA BANKING DAILY, June 29, 2004.
98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100.

Five Federal Agencies Announce Plans to Implement Basel II over Four-year Period, BNA

BANKING DAILY,

101.

June 29, 2004.

See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of BIS guidelines).
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The problem is that banking enterprises tend to be atypical and asymmetrical

with respect to the corporate roles of capital. This is particularly true of the first
and fourth roles of capital just identified. On the other hand, in sharp contrast

with the pattern found in most modern general business corporation statutes,
banking statutes add an additional role for capital-that of gatekeeper to the
industry. In this sense, minimum capital requirements and rules about continuing

capital maintenance, long abandoned as formal requirements for incorporation
under general business corporation statutes, continue to hold sway in the
regulated industry of banking. This fifth role may help to explain why in both
national banking statutes and in the BIS guidelines and proposed Accord, capital

is treated as a central focus of supervisory policy. Is this emphasis warranted as a
matter of fact?
02
Early in the last century, in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff,
U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis observed: "The amount of the deposits is commonly
accepted as a measure of the bank's success; and increase of deposits as evidence
of increased prosperity." Thus, banks are exceptionally adept at using other

people's money, rather than their own capital, as the primary source of
operational resources. It is the bank deposit, a debt arrangement, that serves to
generate the primary bank assets (loans, investments and the like), not a bank's
capital. In fact, banks are among the most highly leveraged of commercial

enterprises.
Of course, it may be argued that supervisory attention to capital requirements
imposes market discipline on banks, and that this discipline will significantly
supplement safety and soundness in banking. This argument remains largely
undemonstrated in empirical terms. Given the highly leveraged condition of
banks, it is likely that the market would in most instances exercise relatively
trivial disciplinary pressure. Furthermore, the capital market is the wrong market
exercising the discipline; depositors, the major "investors" in these enterprises,
tend to refrain from exercising discipline until it is too late.'03

102. 291 U.S. 245 (1934), amended by 291 U.S. 649 (1934), reh'g den'd, 292 U.S. 600 (1934).
103. Some commentators have suggested that complete deregulation-and governance by market forces
represent the correct approach to bank regulatory policy in this regard. See, e.g., Macey & Garrett, Market
Discipline by Depositors:A Summary of the Theoretical and EmpiricalArguments, 5 YALE J. REG. 215 (1988)
(arguing for increased reliance on market discipline by depositors). Market discipline presupposes that investors
(and quasi-investors like depositors) can, and would, influence the choice of risk-generating activities of banks
by their investment decisions. The assessment of the expected returned and potential investment risk by
prospective or current investors might affect an institution's decisions by increasing the expected return offered
(thus increasing the cost of relatively risky activities), or by decreasing the potential risk. There are at least two
problems with this approach, however. First, as an empirical matter, depositors do not generally contract with
depository institutions with the mindset or motivations of investors-nor is it clear that they should. See Garten,
Banking on the Market: Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. REG. 129 (1986) (arguing that
the market discipline approach to bank regulation is unlikely to work in practice, given the behavior of
depositors); Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 YALE J.
REG. 241 (1988) (criticizing market discipline arguments of Macey & Garrett); Garten, Regulatory Growing
Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a DeregulatoryAge, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 558-64 (1989)
(discussing increased attention to the "market discipline" approach to bank regulation). Second, public
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Capital requirements might serve as a tripwire to alert bank and regulator
alike to serious problems in a bank's operations. This argument also remains
undemonstrated as an empirical matter. Even if true, this is at most a post hoc
alarm system, particularly when speaking of operational risk. Conceivably, more
market-sensitive tripwires would make more sense: possibly the oversight of
market performance of subordinated debt-another major component of a bank's
capital structure. However, the volatility of that market may make the trip-wire
very accurate but untimely.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Sources of InternationalLaw
It is a commonplace notion that binding legal principles in public
international law derive from a specific range of recognized sources. °u The
primary source is the body of customary principles of international law, derived
from the common practice of states undertaken because of the perceived binding
nature of the practice (opinio juris).' ' The second source is treaty law-legal
principles derived from conventional practice. A third, more elusive source is the
body of general principles of law recognized by civilized states. A fourth and
final source, much beloved by academics, consists of the writings of recognized
publicists. It would be very difficult to find a place for the issuances and
undertakings of the BIS in this array of sources.
B. The Legal Characterof BIS Issuances
The BIS itself has consistently taken the position that Basel Committee
issuances are not sources of law. Thus, it states on its website:
The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory
authority, and its conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have
legal force. Rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards and
guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the
disclosure is already one instrument of regulation, and its proper role is open to question. See Malloy, Public
Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 229 (1990) (discussing and
criticizing current uses of public disclosure in bank regulation). Indeed, the use of public disclosure in banking
regulation has created additional ambiguity in the regulatory system, because the system is still essentially
committed to a confidential approach to supervision and enforcement. See, e.g., Mathewson, From Confidential
Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP.
L. 139, 146-50 (1986) (discussing development of "confidential supervision" as basic principle of federal bank
regulation).
104. See, e.g., International Court of Justice Statute, art. 38, 1 (identifying sources of law).
105. For a useful example of the establishment of a principle of customary international law, see North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v.
Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement
them through detailed arrangements-statutory or otherwise-which are
best suited to their own national systems. In this way, the Committee
encourages convergence towards common approaches and common
standards without attempting detailed harmonisation of member
countries' supervisory techniques.'O°
This position is reflected in the specific language of BIS issuances,
particularly and most emphatically in the Basel Concordat. The Concordat is not,
by its own terms, a binding international treaty or agreement. It is at best a
statement of principles. The Concordat purports to set forth the optimal operating
principles endorsed by the members of the Committee. Post-Concordat issuances
of the BIS with respect to supervision of multinational banking enterprises, such
as the April 1990 Supplement to the Concordat or the June 1992 Report on
Minimum Standards, do not affect the character or basic framework established
of the Concordat in this regard.
The principles identified in the 1992 Report are considered "standards," but
they are not, on their own explicit terms, binding on states. Nevertheless, the
Report also makes it clear that BIS participating states are expected to implement
the standards, and other states are encouraged to do so-the fourth "standard"
seems to establish a right in participating states to exclude banking enterprises
from states that do not endorse the standards. Indeed, in U.S. practice the fourth
standard has been implemented as a statutory expectation and requires that a nonU.S. based banking enterprise applying for entry will be subject to
comprehensive supervision by its home state as a condition of entry into the U.S.

market. 107
While the BIS has been consistently careful to refrain from asserting sourceof-law status for the issuances of the Basel Committee, products like the 1988
Capital Accord and the proposed Basel II do not express themselves in mere
precatory language, but in prescriptive terms. More importantly, states have
endorsed the specific principles of the Accord as legally binding features of their
national regulatory systems, and the states-and affected private sectors-have
treated the development of Basel II as legally significant. One might argue that
the administrative process of rule-creation performed by the Basel Committee is
itself a source of international regulatory law, intended to be implemented and
enforced by adoption in individual national regulatory systems. It remains then,
to examine the behavior of states and other interested parties in this regard.

106.

BIS,

107.

See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(1)(A) (applying the "comprehensive supervision" rule to branch

THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, at

http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.

htm.
entry).
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C. Behavior of States
Recognition of the untraditional character of this process of rule-creation
should not be blunted by a narrow allegiance to traditional categories of sources
of law under public international law. Contemporary behavior of states with
respect to bank regulatory rules and practices suggests that certain issuances of
the Basel Committee are in fact accorded source-of-law recognition. As the BIS
itself has acknowledged, "[iln many cases, supervisory authorities in non-G-10
countries have seen fit publicly to associate themselves with the Committee's
initiatives.' ' .8 The 1988 Capital Accord is currently used by regulators in over
to determine minimum capital reserves of banks subject to their
100 countries
• •
109
supervision.
Nothing illustrates the law-like character of the Basel II proposal more
clearly than the reaction of interested states-and banking constituencies within
these states-to the details of Basel II in its proposed form. Since U.S. law
applies the 1988 Capital Accord to all depository institutions, adoption of Basel
II would pose particularly difficult regulatory issues concerning disparate
treatment. It has been estimated that the ten largest U.S. banks would adopt the
more flexible IRB approach to capital adequacy, with perhaps the next largest ten
to twenty banks also permitted to do so." 0 The remaining thousands of depository
institutions would continue to be subject to the more restrictive regime of the
1988 Capital Accord. Members of the Senate Banking Committee have raised
critical questions about this dichotomy in treatment under Basel II.1" For
example, would lower capital costs for the largest twenty to thirty U.S. banks
create an unjustifiable competitive disadvantage for large regional banks and
smaller "community" banks? Could this situation result in a renewed wave of
acquisitions, eliminating smaller banks that service local communities?
Furthermore, competitive issues aside, does Basel II give too much discretion to
the largest banks to formulate the specific capital requirements that will apply to
them?
In May 2003, a bill entitled the United States Financial Policy Committee
For Fair Capital Standards Act ' 2 was introduced to establish a formal mechanism
- for developing uniform U.S. positions on issues before the Basel Committee, and
to require a review of the most recent proposals of the Committee on Basel H.
The House Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee approved
the bill and recommended it to the full House Financial Services Committee on

108.
109.

BIS, THE BASEL COMMIrEE, supra note 106.
Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites Mixed Results for Meeting Proposed CapitalAccord, BNA

INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 24, 2001, at d2.

110.
111.
112.

R. Christian Bruce, Regulators Must Supply More Answers, supra note 89, at 1.
See id. at 1-2 (discussing issues raised).
H.R. 2043, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
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July 16, 2003."' Aside from further slowing the progress of the Basel II proposal,
one effect of the bill would be to reduce the relative influence of the Federal
Reserve in committee negotiations.'"4 This development, and the continuing
Congressional criticism of the Basel II process, prompted the Deputy Secretary
General of the Basel Committee to criticize publicly the "politicized" process
fostered by intense lobbying by U.S. banks."' Not surprisingly, this criticism
elicited a harsh response by congressional leaders and U.S. bank lobbyists
alike." 6 By mid-July 2003, the process became even more politicized, as
lobbyists for the relatively smaller "community" banks urged Congress to include
the Office of Thrift Supervision on the interagency committee, so that the
Office-the U.S. regulator of relatively smaller savings associations and their
holding companies-would have a formal role on the Basel Committee." 7
Even the largest U.S. banks are not entirely comfortable with Basel II. In

testimony before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions, representatives of this group expressed opposition to a capital charge

for operational risk under Pillar 1, preferring "improved bank supervision" under
Pillar 2 as "the best way to tackle operational risk."" 8 This view reinforces the

113. Karen L. Werner, House Subcommittee Approves Measure Establishing Federal Basel Policy
Committee, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 17, 2003.
114. R. Christian Bruce, Hawke Supports Fed on OperationalRisk, supra note 118, at 2. The proposed
interagency committee would include the U.S. Treasury Secretary as chair, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency (supervisor of national banks), and
the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id.
115. See Patrick Tracey, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Questions 'Integrity' of
Congressional Review, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 26, 2003 (discussing controversy). Germany's central
bank, the Bundesbank, also criticized U.S. efforts to re-open key elements of the agreement, arguing that these
efforts threatened to terminate the Basel II process. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Expected to Focus, supra
note 118, at 2.
116. See Patrick Tracey, Basel Committee, supra note 15, at I (discussing controversy); Shelby
CounterattacksBasel Official Who Questioned Campaign Funds From Banks, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 27,
2003 (reporting Senate Banking Committee Chair's characterization of remarks as "uninformed and highly
inappropriate").
117. Karen Werner, Bachus Urged to Amend Legislation, Place OTS on U.S. Basel Policy Committee,
BNA BANKING DAILY, July 15, 2003, at 1. At the same time, the lobbyist group, America's Community
Bankers, repudiated suggestions that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission be given membership in the
interagency committee. Id. at 2.
118. R. Christian Bruce, Hawke Supports Fed on OperationalRisk, Says Basel Method Offers Enough
Discretion, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 20, 2003, at 1. The Swiss Government and the Swiss banking
community have also expressed concerns about the capital requirements for operational risk. Daniel Pruzin,
Basel Committee Expected to Focus On Future of BeleagueredCapitalAccord, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 10,
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suggestion that the Basel II process is about rule-creation, not merely exhortation
of "best practice." Likewise, the opposition of the British Bankers' Association
and the London Investments Banking Association to Basel II is explicitly based
on their preference for a more "principles-based" approach rather than what they
perceive as "prescriptive rules" in the latest version of the proposal." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, there is no discernible distinction between the intensity
of the criticism and negotiations surrounding the proposal and that which
surrounds the negotiation of a major treaty undertaking or a significant legislative
proposal. It is difficult to credit the insistence of the BIS that what is at the heart
of the extended consultations over Basel II is merely a "statement[] of best
practice." While it is true that the Basel Committee possesses no "formal
supranational supervisory authority," that observation seems to belie the fact that
the contemporary practice of the Committee seems to represent the emergence of
a new kind of source of law: an international administrative practice involving
rule proposal for public comment, revision in light of public comments, and
adoption, implementation, and enforcement at the national level.

119.

Cf. supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing associations' opposition).

